Remember the January 2015 acquittal of a Park Forest Police Officer who, at a nursing home, shot a 95 year old man with a shotgun that fired bean bags. NEMRT Legal Instructor Thomas F. McGuire addresses the May 15, 2015 Supreme Court of the United States California case dealing with a remarkably similar situation to that encountered by the Park Forest Officer; the Court, in substance, stating that the Officers involved in the California case were not civilly liable for shooting a woman who suffers from a schizoaffective disorder who became physically violent.
The facts of the case as stated by the Court are as follows:
“In August 2008, Sheehan lived in a group home for people dealing with mental illness. Although she shared common areas of the building with others, she had a private room. On August 7, Heath Hodge, a social worker who supervised the counseling staff in the building, attempted to visit Sheehan to conduct a welfare check. Hodge was concerned because Sheehan had stopped taking her medication, no longer spoke with her psychiatrist, and reportedly was no longer changing her clothes or eating. See 743 F.3d 1211, 1218 (C.A.9 2014); App. 23–24.
Hodge knocked on Sheehan’s door but received no answer. He then used a key to enter her room and found Sheehan on her bed. Initially, she would not respond to questions. But she then sprang up, reportedly yelling, “Get out of here! You don’t have a warrant! I have a knife, and I’ll kill you if I have to.” Hodge left without seeing whether she actually had a knife, and Sheehan slammed the door shut behind him. See 743 F.3d, at 1218.
Sheehan, Hodge realized, required “some sort of intervention,” App. 96, but he also knew that he would need help. Hodge took steps to clear the building of other people and completed an application to have Sheehan detained for temporary evaluation and treatment. See Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code Ann. § 5150 (West 2015 Cum. Supp.) (authorizing temporary detention of someone who “as a result of a mental health disorder, is a danger to others, or to himself or herself, or gravely disabled”). On that application, Hodge checked off boxes indicating that Sheehan was a “threat to others” and “gravely disabled,” but he did not mark that she was a danger to herself. 743 F.3d, at 1218. He telephoned the police and asked for help to take Sheehan to a secure facility.
Officer Holder responded to police dispatch and headed toward the group home. When she arrived, Holder reviewed the temporary-detention application and spoke with Hodge. Holder then sought assistance from Sergeant Reynolds, a more experienced officer. After Reynolds arrived and was brought up to speed, Hodge spoke with a nurse at the psychiatric emergency services unit at San Francisco General Hospital who said that the hospital would be able to admit Sheehan.
Accompanied by Hodge, the officers went to Sheehan’s room, knocked on her door, announced who they were, and told Sheehan that “we want to help you.” App. 36. When Sheehan did not answer, the officers used Hodge’s key to enter the room. Sheehan reacted violently. She grabbed a kitchen knife with an approximately 5–inch blade and began approaching the officers, yelling something along the lines of “I am going to kill you. I don’t need help. Get out.” Ibid. See also id., at 284 (“[Q.] Did you tell them I’ll kill you if you don’t get out of here? A. Yes”). The officers—who did not have their weapons drawn—“retreated and Sheehan closed the door, leaving Sheehan in her room and the officers and Hodge in the hallway.” 743 F.3d, at 1219. The officers called for backup and sent Hodge downstairs to let in reinforcements when they arrived.
The officers were concerned that the door to Sheehan’s room was closed. They worried that Sheehan, out of their sight, might gather more weapons—Reynolds had already observed other knives in her room, see App. 228—or even try to flee through the back window, id., at 227. Because Sheehan’s room was on the second floor, she likely would have needed a ladder to escape. Fire escapes, however, are common in San Francisco, and the officers did not know whether Sheehan’s room had such an escape. (Neither officer asked Hodge about a fire escape, but if they had, it seems he “probably” would have said there was one, id., at 117). With the door closed, all that Reynolds and Holder knew for sure was that Sheehan was unstable, she had just threatened to kill three people, and she had a weapon.1
Reynolds and Holder had to make a decision. They could wait for backup—indeed, they already heard sirens. Or they could quickly reenter the room and try to subdue Sheehan before more time elapsed. Because Reynolds believed that the situation “required [their] immediate attention,” id., at 235, the officers chose reentry. In making that decision, they did not pause to consider whether Sheehan’s disability should be accommodated. See 743 F.3d, at 1219. The officers obviously knew that Sheehan was unwell, but in Reynolds’ words, that was “a secondary issue” given that they were “faced with a violent woman who had already threatened to kill her social worker” and “two uniformed police officers.” App. 235.
The officers ultimately decided that Holder—the larger officer—should push the door open while Reynolds used pepper spray on Sheehan. With pistols drawn, the officers moved in. When Sheehan, knife in hand, saw them, she again yelled for them to leave. She may also have again said that she was going to kill them. Sheehan is “not sure” if she threatened death a second time, id., at 284, but “concedes that it was her intent to resist arrest and to use the knife,” 743 F.3d, at 1220. In any event, Reynolds began pepper-spraying Sheehan in the face, but Sheehan would not drop the knife. When Sheehan was only a few feet away, Holder shot her twice, but she did not collapse. Reynolds then fired multiple shots.2 After Sheehan finally fell, a third officer (who had just arrived) kicked the knife out of her hand. Sheehan survived.
Sometime later, San Francisco prosecuted Sheehan for assault with a deadly weapon, assault on a peace officer with a deadly weapon, and making criminal threats. The jury acquitted Sheehan of making threats but was unable to reach a verdict on the assault counts, and prosecutors decided not to retry her.
Sheehan then brought suit, alleging, among other things, that San Francisco violated the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 104 Stat. 327, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., by subduing her in a manner that did not reasonably accommodate her disability. She also sued Reynolds and Holder in their personal capacities under Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for violating her Fourth Amendment rights. In support of her claims, she offered testimony from a former deputy police chief, Lou Reiter, who contended that Reynolds and Holder fell short of their training by not using practices designed to minimize the risk of violence when dealing with the mentally ill.
The District Court granted summary judgment for petitioners. Relying on Hainze v. Richards, 207 F.3d 795 (C.A.5 2000), the court held that officers making an arrest are not required “to first determine whether their actions would comply with the ADA before protecting themselves and others.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 80. The court also held that the officers did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The court wrote that the officers “had no way of knowing whether [Sheehan] might escape through a back window or fire escape, whether she might hurt herself, or whether there was anyone else in her room whom she might hurt.” Id., at 71. In addition, the court observed that Holder did not begin shooting until it was necessary for her to do so in order “to protect herself” and that “Reynolds used deadly force only after she found that pepper spray was not enough force to contain the situation.” Id., at 75, 76–77.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit vacated in part. Relevant here, the panel held that because the ADA covers public “services, programs, or activities,” § 12132, the ADA’s accommodation requirement should be read to “to encompass ‘anything a public entity does,’ ” 743 F.3d, at 1232. The Ninth Circuit agreed “that exigent circumstances inform the reasonableness analysis under the ADA,” ibid., but concluded that it was for a jury to decide whether San Francisco should have accommodated Sheehan by, for instance, “respect[ing] her comfort zone, engag[ing] in non-threatening communications and us[ing] the passage of time to defuse the situation rather than precipitating a deadly confrontation.”Id., at 1233.
As to Reynolds and Holder, the panel held that their initial entry into Sheehan’s room was lawful and that, after the officers opened the door for the second time, they reasonably used their firearms when the pepper spray failed to stop Sheehan’s advance. Nonetheless, the panel also held that a jury could find that the officers “provoked” Sheehan by needlessly forcing that second confrontation. Id., at 1216, 1229. The panel further found that it was clearly established that an officer cannot “forcibly enter the home of an armed, mentally ill subject who had been acting irrationally and had threatened anyone who entered when there was no objective need for immediate entry.” Id., at 1229. Dissenting in part, Judge Graber would have held that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity.”
In deciding not to address the ADA issue, the Court stated:
“Our decision not to decide whether the ADA applies to arrests is reinforced by the parties’ failure to address a related question: whether a public entity can be liable for damages under Title II for an arrest made by its police officers. Only public entities are subject to Title II, see, e.g.,Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 208, 118 S.Ct. 1952, 141 L.Ed.2d 215 (1998), and the parties agree that such an entity can be held vicariously liable for money damages for the purposeful or deliberately indifferent conduct of its employees. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 10–12, 22. But we have never decided whether that is correct, and we decline to do so here, in the absence of adversarial briefing.
Because certiorari jurisdiction exists to clarify the law, its exercise “is not a matter of right, but of judicial discretion.” Supreme Court Rule 10. Exercising that discretion, we dismiss the first question presented as improvidently granted. See, e.g., Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett,531 U.S. 356, 360, n. 1, 121 S.Ct. 955, 148 L.Ed.2d 866 (2001) (partial dismissal); Parker v. Dugger,498 U.S. 308, 323, 111 S.Ct. 731, 112 L.Ed.2d 812 (1991) (same).”
The question addressed by the Court was:
“The second question presented is whether Reynolds and Holder can be held personally liable for the injuries that Sheehan suffered. We conclude they are entitled to qualified immunity.3
Public officials are immune from suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless they have “violated a statutory or constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.” Plumhoff, 572 U.S., at ––––, 134 S.Ct., at 2023 (internal quotation marks omitted). An officer “cannot be said to have violated a clearly established right unless the right’s contours were sufficiently definite that any reasonable official in [his] shoes would have understood that he was violating it,” ibid., meaning that “existing precedent … placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Ashcroft v. al–Kidd, 563 U.S. ––––, ––––, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 2083, 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011). This exacting standard “gives government officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments” by “protect [ing] all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Id., at ––––, 131 S.Ct., at 2085.
In this case, although we disagree with the Ninth Circuit’s ultimate conclusion on the question of qualified immunity, we agree with its analysis in many respects. For instance, there is no doubt that the officers did not violate any federal right when they opened Sheehan’s door the first time. See 743 F.3d, at 1216, 1223. Reynolds and Holder knocked on the door, announced that they were police officers, and informed Sheehan that they wanted to help her. When Sheehan did not come to the door, they entered her room. This was not unconstitutional. “[L]aw enforcement officers may enter a home without a warrant to render emergency assistance to an injured occupant or to protect an occupant from imminent injury.” Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403, 126 S.Ct. 1943, 164 L.Ed.2d 650 (2006). See also Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. ––––, ––––, 131 S.Ct. 1849, 1856–1857, 179 L.Ed.2d 865 (2011).
Nor is there any doubt that had Sheehan not been disabled, the officers could have opened her door the second time without violating any constitutional rights. For one thing, “because the two entries were part of a single, continuous search or seizure, the officers [were] not required to justify the continuing emergency with respect to the second entry.” 743 F.3d, at 1224 (following Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 511, 98 S.Ct. 1942, 56 L.Ed.2d 486 (1978)). In addition, Reynolds and Holder knew that Sheehan had a weapon and had threatened to use it to kill three people. They also knew that delay could make the situation more dangerous. The Fourth Amendment standard is reasonableness, and it is reasonable for police to move quickly if delay “would gravely endanger their lives or the lives of others.” Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298–299, 87 S.Ct. 1642, 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967). This is true even when, judged with the benefit of hindsight, the officers may have made “some mistakes.” Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. ––––, ––––, 135 S.Ct. 530, 536, 190 L.Ed.2d 475 (2014). The Constitution is not blind to “the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments.” Plumhoff, supra, at ––––, 134 S.Ct., at 2020.
We also agree with the Ninth Circuit that after the officers opened Sheehan’s door the second time, their use of force was reasonable. Reynolds tried to subdue Sheehan with pepper spray, but Sheehan kept coming at the officers until she was “only a few feet from a cornered Officer Holder.” 743 F.3d, at 1229. At this point, the use of potentially deadly force was justified. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 384, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007). Nothing in the Fourth Amendment barred Reynolds and Holder from protecting themselves, even though it meant firing multiple rounds.
The real question, then, is whether, despite these dangerous circumstances, the officers violated the Fourth Amendment when they decided to reopen Sheehan’s door rather than attempting to accommodate her disability. Here we come to another problem. San Francisco, whose attorneys represent Reynolds and Holder, devotes scant briefing to this question. Instead, San Francisco argues almost exclusively that even if it is assumed that there was a Fourth Amendment violation, the right was not clearly established. This Court, of course, could decide the constitutional question anyway. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 242, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (recognizing discretion). But because this question has not been adequately briefed, we decline to do so. See id., at 239, 129 S.Ct. 808. Rather, we simply decide whether the officers’ failure to accommodate Sheehan’s illness violated clearly established law. It did not.”
Finally, in deciding the case, the Court stated:
“Even if an officer acts contrary to her training, however, (and here, given the generality of that training, it is not at all clear that Reynolds and Holder did so), that does not itself negate qualified immunity where it would otherwise be warranted. Rather, so long as “a reasonable officer could have believed that his conduct was justified,” a plaintiff cannot “avoi[d] summary judgment by simply producing an expert’s report that an officer’s conduct leading up to a deadly confrontation was imprudent, inappropriate, or even reckless.” Billington, supra, at 1189. Cf. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 216, n. 6, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (GINSBURG, J., concurring in judgment) (“ ‘[I]n close cases, a jury does not automatically get to second-guess these life and death decisions, even though a plaintiff has an expert and a plausible claim that the situation could better have been handled differently’ ” (quoting Roy v. Inhabitants of Lewiston, 42 F.3d 691, 695 (C.A.1 1994))). Considering the specific situation confronting Reynolds and Holder, they had sufficient reason to believe that their conduct was justified.
(“Knowledge of a person’s disability simply cannot foreclose officers from protecting themselves, the disabled person, and the general public”); Sanders v. Minneapolis,474 F.3d 523, 527 (C.A.8 2007) (following Bates, supra ); Menuel v. Atlanta, 25 F.3d 990 (C.A.11 1994) (upholding use of deadly force to try to apprehend a mentally ill man who had a knife and was hiding behind a door).
In sum, we hold that qualified immunity applies because these officers had no “fair and clear warning of what the Constitution requires.” al–Kidd, supra, at ––––, 131 S.Ct., at 2086–2087(KENNEDY, J., concurring). Because the qualified immunity analysis is straightforward, we need not decide whether the Constitution was violated by the officers’ failure to accommodate Sheehan’s illness.”
Attachment:CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA V. SHEEHAN, 135 S.Ct. 1765.
Law Office of Thomas F. McGuire, Ltd. 